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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1998, National Basketball Association (“NBA”) commissioner David
Stern grew a “lockout beard” for nearly half a year, declaring that it would
remain intact until the league and union came to an agreement and resumed
the basketball season.1 Currently, the threat of yet another beard, in addition to
another truncated or cancelled season, looms over the NBA and up until very
recently, lingered over the National Football League (“NFL”).2
Within the last several months, the NBA and NFL’s collective bargaining
agreements (“CBA”) have expired, leaving both leagues with serious doubt
regarding the cancellation or delay of their 2011 seasons due to disagreements
about several mandatory subjects of collective bargaining between their front
offices and unions.3
As of the date of this article, the NBA has instituted a lockout of its players,
and the NFL ratified a new ten-year CBA with the National Football League
Players Association (“NFLPA”) on July 25, 2011 following a five-month long
lockout.4
Decertification, or dissolution, of a labor union, is one option available
to labor organizations—including players’ associations—during collective
bargaining negotiations.5 With the owners seemingly holding so much power
and with the longstanding history of lockouts present in both leagues, the
possibility of decertifying the union with the National Labor Relations Board

1. See Steve Aschburner, Lockout Revisited, 10 Years Later, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED
(July 8, 2008), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2008/writers/steve_aschburner/07/08/
lockout.revisited/ (“But the way most people remember it, the league’s angry and newly
vulnerable chief executive let his retro whiskers grow symbolically from bitter start to
exhausting finish . . . .”).
2. See Laura Clawson, NFL Lockout Ends, DAILY KOS (July 25, 2011, 11:36 A.M.),
http://www.dailykos.com/story/2011/07/25/998457/-NFL-lockout-ends (allowing for
current players to remain in the NFL’s medical plan for life a provision which was hotly
debated in prior negotiations).
3. See Larry Coon, Lockout Looms Over 2010-11 Season, ESPN.COM
(Sept.
22,
2010),
http://sports.espn.go.com/nba/columns/story?columnist=coon_
larry&page=lockout-100922 (explaining that if a new CBA is not agreed upon by the NBA
and players’ union prior to the expiration of the current CBA a league-imposed lockout will
likely ensue, threatening cancellation of 2011–12 season); Union Head Says Owners Set for
Lockout, ESPN.COM (Oct. 5, 2010), http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=5652700
(explaining that a stumbling block for negotiation of a new CBA is that the NFL, although
claiming financial difficulties, will not share its books with the union).
4
See generally, CBA Expires, NBA Locks Out Its Players, ESPN.COM (July 1,
2011), http://sports.espn.go.com/nba/news/story?id=6723645 (detailing both sides of
the labor dispute which erupted on Friday, July 1, 2011, when its CBA expired); Judy
Battista, As the Lockout Ends, the Scrambling Begins, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2011), at
B10, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/26/sports/football/NFL-Union-LaborDeal.html?pagewanted=all (“After nearly five months of inactivity by all but a handful of
negotiators, the NFL sprang to life again Monday when [thirty-two] player representatives
voted unanimously to recommend approval of a [ten]-year labor deal that owners largely
approved last Thursday.”).
5. See GLENN M. WONG, ESSENTIALS OF SPORTS LAW 528–29 (4th ed. 2010)
(explaining that if a union votes to decertify, players would no longer have any “affiliation
with the union and no collective bargaining agreement would be in place”).
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(“NLRB” or “Board”) may appear to be the best option for players.6 Based
on the likelihood of the owners instituting a lockout following the expiration
of the CBA, a decertification of the NBA Players Association (“NBPA”) is
arguably the only tool left to ensure a 2011 season.7 Recent decertification
efforts in both leagues reveal, however, that such a move can result in a negative
economic impact on players’ salaries and free agency status.8 Thus, the legal
options available to a players’ union via the NLRB and provide a more stable
and successful alternative in dealing with the current labor situations in the
NBA and the NFL.
This Article will examine, analyze, and propose a solution for the NBPA
by considering the interplay between the National Labor Relations Act
(“NLRA” or “Act”), the NLRB, and the history of labor disputes in the NBA
and the recently revived NFL. Part II will provide a background on collective
bargaining under the Act, the jurisdiction of the NLRB, and how it applies to
the unique circumstances of the sports industry.9 Part III will outline the labor
histories of the NBPA and the NFLPA, including important legal challenges to
collective bargaining and antitrust restraint claims, and will discuss the current
situation facing the NBA and NBPA.10 Part IV will analyze the likely negative
results of decertification in comparison to the strength of a certified players’
association, as well as illustrate the disadvantaged position that a union inhabits
in today’s economy after decertification.11
II. BACKGROUND
To safeguard both employers and employees, and to “promote[ ] the flow of
commerce,” the NLRA regulates collective bargaining relationships between
employers and designated employee unions.12 The history of labor

6. See generally Eric R. McDonough, Escaping Antitrust Immunity—Decertification
of the National Basketball Players Association, 37 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 821 (1997)
(proposing, in the context of the late 1990s dispute between the NBA and NBPA, that
decertification of the NBPA, following the expiration of the then-current CBA, would
allow players to compete in a more free market and receive fair market value wages).
7. Cf. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Williams, 857 F. Supp. 1069, 1078 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)
(explaining that decertification allows players to pursue new strategies, such as challenging
league practices through a strikes or through antitrust claims).
8. See Decertification: The NFLPA and NBPA’s Nuclear Option, LAW360
(January 18, 2011), www.constantinecannon.com/pdf_etc/complaw360art011811.pdf

(explaining that decertification would eliminate guaranteed salaries and pensions
for the players and the ability to negotiate and control their marketing and licensing
rights).
9. See infra Part II (discussing the application of the NLRA to professional sports
labor disputes).
10. See infra Part III (analyzing the effects of the most recent NFL decertification and
the future of the NBA lockout).
11. See infra Part IV (providing an accounting of the labor history and current labor
relations disputes present in the NBA and the NFL).
12. See generally National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2006)
(attempting to rectify the unequal bargaining power between employers and employees
through provision for collective bargaining).
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law, stemming from the Wagner Act,13 is based around the policy of bringing
employers and employees together to encourage negotiation and agreement.14
A. Collective Bargaining and the NLRA
In 1935, Congress passed the NLRA to protect the rights of employees and
employers, to encourage collective bargaining, and to curtail certain labor
and management practices deemed harmful to the workforce and economy of
the United States.15 In order to carry-out this process, Congress charged the
NLRB with administering the provisions of the Act.16 The Board has two main
functions: (1) to determine, through elections, whether a group of employees
wish to be represented by a union in dealing with their employers and if so,
by which union; and (2) to prevent “unfair labor practices by private sector
employers and unions.”17
The Board’s authority includes oversight of union representative elections
by employees,18 as well as the governing of elections when employees seek to
dissolve their labor organization as their exclusive bargaining representative.19
The Board is also empowered to regulate unfair labor practices by conducting
investigations, issuing complaints, and petitioning courts for relief.20 One of
the key aspects of labor practices between labor organizations and employers
is the mandatory obligation to bargain collectively when a labor unit has
elected an exclusive bargaining agent.21 This obligation exists “with respect
to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment,” and requires
that both sides negotiate in “good faith.”22
The process of collective bargaining begins with the selection of an
13. National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935)
(codified as amended 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2006)).
14. See 1 PATRICK HARDIN ET AL., THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 26–27 (4th ed.
2001) (providing Senator Wagner’s belief that, in an industrial era dominated by large
corporations, employees needed the ability to bargain together in order to assure their
rights, with regard to the need for the passage of the Wagner Act).
15. See id. (explaining that the “cornerstone” of the Wagner Act was Section 7, which
gave employees “the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations,
to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in
concerted activities for . . . mutual aid and protection”).
16. See § 153 (creating the NLRB to adjudicate, investigate, and enforce the NLRA
to remedy historically lax enforcement that plagued previous labor laws).
17. What We Do, NAT’L LAB. RELATIONS BD., http://www.nlrb.gov/what-we-do (last
visited Apr. 23, 2011).
18. § 159(c).
19. See § 159(e) (requiring that thirty percent of eligible employees must petition the
Board, no sooner than one year after a union had previously been certified, for an election
to decertify a previously-certified bargaining representative).
20. See § 160(e) (permitting the NLRB to seek relief in federal district court to enjoin
ongoing unfair labor practices).
21. See § 158(d) (specifying that the duty to bargain in good faith is aimed at the
consummation of a written collective bargaining agreement between the employer and the
bargaining representative).
22. See id. (explaining, however, that such an “obligation does not compel either
party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession”).
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appropriate unit for the purpose of bargaining with the employer.23 The unit
representative is selected by a majority of all employees within an appropriate
unit at the employer’s facility or plant; after the representative collectively
bargains with an employer over several mandated conditions of employment.24
The Board’s statutorily-mandated determination of an “appropriate unit for
collective bargaining” is adjudicated before, and decided by the Board, and
cannot be overruled or interfered with by a court, unless the Board’s decision
is arbitrary or capricious.25 Additionally, the Board has the authority to decline
to exercise jurisdiction over an employment organization if the labor dispute
does not have a sufficiently substantial impact on interstate commerce.26
Once the selection of an exclusive bargaining unit is complete, the
collective bargaining process ensues. There is a duty for both the employer
and the unit representative to bargain in good faith, failure to do so is an unfair
labor practice.27 The language in the Act creates two subject matter categories
for collective bargaining—mandatory and permissive subjects.28 To be a
mandatory subject of collective bargaining, a term must “settle an aspect of
the relationship between the employer and employees.”29

23. For instance, when an employer has two plants that manufacture different
product lines, the employer may ask the Board to segregate the two into two different
bargaining units. If the employer is successful, each plant would then have to separately
select a certified exclusive bargaining representative (union) and each representative would
have to bargain with the employer separately. See § 159(a)–(b); Ethan Lock, The Scope of
the Labor Exemption in Professional Sports, 1989 DUKE L.J. 339, 382 (1989) (“When a
majority of employees designate a union to represent them, an employer must . . . bargain
in good faith with the employees’ representatives . . . .”).
24. See § 159(a) (“Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of
collective bargaining . . . shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such
a unit” regarding mandatory subjects of bargaining, including “rates of pay, wages, hours
of employment, or other conditions of employment.”).
25. See NLRB v. Lettie Lee, Inc., 140 F.2d 243, 247–50 (9th Cir. 1944) (upholding
the Board’s determination that sloper and trimmer employees were also qualified cutters
and that all three could join in an appropriate bargaining unit together). A federal court
usually defers to an “administrative agency [like the NLRB] because of its own lack of
experience with issues or the need to protect the authority of the agency.” HARDIN ET AL.,
supra note 14, at 2282.
26. See § 164(c)(1); see also Sec. Guards & Watchmen Local No. 803 (Yonkers
Raceway, Inc.), 196 N.L.R.B. 373, 373 (1972) (declining jurisdiction over the horse racing
industry, even though racing had “some effect” on interstate commerce).
27. See § 158(a)(5) (prohibiting an employer from refusing to bargain collectively
with his employees’ chose representative); § 158(d) (“[T]o bargain collectively is the
performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the
employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith . . . .”).
28. See NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 348–49
(1958) (holding that an employer cannot insist on acceptance of non-mandatory terms
as a precondition to reaching an agreement, even when the employer otherwise agrees to
bargain over mandatory terms).
29. See Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers of Am., Local Union No. 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate
Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 178 (1971) (explaining that there is no penalty or repercussion if
parties refuse to negotiate with regard to permissive subjects).
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An unfair labor charge can be brought when one party refuses to bargain in
good faith over a mandatory subject.30 The good faith requirement to bargain
collectively, however, does not indicate a necessity for parties to reach an
agreement.31 The “good faith” requirement in collective bargaining is focused
on the standards of behavior in the bargaining process, not on results.32
A theory of judicial non-intervention supports the purpose of the NLRB
refereeing the collective bargaining process.33 While the Act establishes the
right of employees to join labor organizations and engage in collective action,
it also guarantees the right of employees to abstain from forming or joining a
labor union.34 Additionally, the Act provides a strict procedure for decertifying
a labor organization by a vote of the union’s members.35 Following a petition to
the NLRB for decertification signed by at least thirty percent of the employees,
the Board takes a secret ballot poll of the entire bargaining unit to determine
whether or not to decertify the unit.36 If the majority of employees vote against
the continuation of the union as the exclusive representative of the bargaining
unit, the Board then decertifies the union.37
B. The Labor Exemption
Because the union-employer relationship can often lead to accusations of
antitrust violations, courts have recognized a “non-statutory labor exemption”
from antitrust law in certain agreements reached in the course of collective

30. See § 158(a)(5) (“It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer . . . to refuse
to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees [over mandatory subjects
of bargaining].”).
31. See NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 152 (1956) (“While Congress did
not compel agreement between employers and bargaining representatives, it did require
collective bargaining in the hope that agreements would result.”); H.J. Heinz Co. v. NLRB,
311 U.S. 514, 525 (1941) (“It is true that the National Labor Relations Act, while requiring
the employer to bargain collectively, does not compel him to enter into an agreement.”).
32. Cf. NLRB v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432, 435–36 (1967) (stressing that the
employer has an obligation to supply all relevant information necessary for the employees’
bargaining representative to perform its duties); NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 743 (1962)
(holding that the duty “may be violated without a general failure of subjective good faith”).
33. See generally Lock, supra note 23, at 381–83 (explaining the theory behind
restraint in judicial intervention during the bargaining process as being consistent with
congressional intent manifested in the text of the Act).
34. See § 157 (“Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join,
or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing . . . and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all such activities except to
the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor
organization as a condition of employment . . . .”).
35. See § 159(c)(1) (requiring an initial petition by employees); see also 29 C.F.R. §§
102.83–102.84 (2010) (regulating the form, content, and procedure for presentation to the
NLRB of decertification petitions).
36. § 159(e)(1).
37. Id.
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bargaining under the NLRA.38 The primary purpose of the labor exemption
is to protect labor organizations and their bargaining activities.39 Typically,
antitrust actions are brought under the Sherman Act, which condemns “[e]
very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy,
in restraint of trade or commerce.”40 The Supreme Court has held, however,
that parties engaged in labor agreements can be immune from antitrust laws.41
The Court cited a “strong labor policy” favoring labor agreements, even in the
face of antitrust restraints.42 The labor exemption and antitrust immunity apply
when agreements at issue relate to mandatory subjects of bargaining such as
wages, hours, and terms and conditions of employment.43
C. The NLRA and Collective Bargaining as Applied to the Sports Industry
In 1969 the Board established its jurisdiction over professional sports leagues,
holding in American League of Professional Baseball Clubs44 that Congress

38. See Connell Const. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local No. 100, 421 U.S. 616,
622 (1975) (recognizing “the nonstatutory exemption” to federal antitrust law protects the
unions ability to “eliminate competition over wages and working competitions” and to
inevitably “affect price competition among employers”); Local No. 189, Amalgamated
Meat Cutters, Butcher Workmen of N. Am. v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 691 (1965)
(“[T]he national labor policy expressed in the National Labor Relations Act places beyond
the reach of the Sherman Act union-employer agreements on when, as well as how long,
employees must work.”); see also 15 U.S.C. § 17 (2006) (“The labor of a human being
is not a commodity or article of commerce. Nothing contained in the antitrust laws shall
be construed to forbid the existence and operation of labor, agricultural, or horticultural
organizations, instituted for the purposes of mutual help, and not having capital stock or
conducted for profit, or to forbid or restrain individual members of such organizations
from lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects thereof; nor shall such organizations,
or the members thereof, be held or construed to be illegal combinations or conspiracies
in restraint of trade, under the antitrust laws.”); cf. 29 U.S.C. § 105 (2006) (preventing
federal courts from enjoining activity that would otherwise be considered “an unlawful
combination or conspiracy because of the doing in concert of [certain] acts” in the context
of a labor dispute).
39. See, e.g., United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 229–33 (1941) (holding
that labor actions directed at an employer but due to “internecine” conflict between two
competing labor organizations did not violate the antitrust law); but cf. Allen Bradley Co.
v. Local Union No. 3, Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 325 U.S. 797, 807–11 (1945) (noting,
however, that the exemption does not permit unions to combine with non-labor groups in
order “to create business monopolies and to control the marketing of goods and services”).
40. 15 U.S.C. § 1.
41. See 312 U.S. at 229–33 (explaining that “whether trade union conduct constitutes
a violation of the Sherman Law is to be determined only by reading the Sherman Law and
[Section] 20 of the Clayton Act and the Norris-LaGuardia Act as a harmonizing text of
outlawry of labor conduct”).
42. See 421 U.S. at 622 (“[T]he goals of federal labor law never could be achieved if
this effect on business competition were held a violation of the antitrust laws.”).
43. See id. (“The nonstatutory exemption has its source in the strong labor policy
favoring the association of employees to eliminate competition over wages and working
conditions.”).
44. Am. League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs & Ass’n of Nat’l Baseball League Umpires,
180 N.L.R.B. 190 (1969).
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intended for the Act to apply to Major League Baseball.45 And reasoned
that, based on its policy of encouraging collective bargaining, it should assert
its jurisdiction and subject any professional team sports labor dispute to the
Act.46 For the first time, the Board accepted the idea that professional baseball
affects interstate commerce, and thus ruled that professional baseball is subject
to the Act.47 The Supreme Court applied the Board’s holding in Radovich v.
Nat’l Football League to determine that both football48 and basketball49 affect
interstate commerce under the Commerce Clause and are, by extension, subject
to the NLRA.
Then, in 1980 the Fifth Circuit established that when facing a joint
employer relationship, such as a professional sports league, a league-wide,
multi-employer bargaining unit was appropriate because the unit had “common
labor problems and a high degree of centralized control over labor relations.”50
And rationalized that only a bargaining unit comprised of every league player
can wield enough bargaining power to challenge professional sports leagues.51
For multi–employer certification, the NLRB requires either such a joint
agreement between the parties or a controlling history of bargaining on a
45. See id. at 192 (“We can find, neither in the statute nor in its legislative history, any
expression of a Congressional intent that disputes between employers and employees in
[the] industry [of professional sports] should be removed from the scheme of the National
Labor Relations Act.”).
46. See JOHN C. WEISTART & CYM H. LOWELL, THE LAW OF SPORT § 6.03, at 788
(1979) (explaining that the Act is broad enough to permit the Board to exercise jurisdiction
over “all the employees” in professional team sports, “from bat boys to maintenance men”).
47. See id. at 190–91 (“Congressional deliberations regarding the relationship
of baseball and other professional team sports to the antitrust laws likewise reflect a
Congressional assumption that such sports are subject to regulation under the commerce
clause . . . [and] legal scholars have agreed . . . that professional sports are in or affect
interstate commerce, and as such are subject to the Board’s jurisdiction.” (footnotes
omitted)). See generally NLRB v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601 (1939) (establishing that that
the Board had authority under the NLRA to exert jurisdiction over an employer even when
a manufacturer was not directly involved in interstate commerce but instead, received and
shipped a small volume of manufactured goods through interstate commerce).
48. Cf. Radovich v. Nat’l Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 452 (1957) (“[T]he volume
of interstate business involved in organized professional football places it within the
provisions of the [Sherman] Act.”).
49. Cf. Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Mgmt., Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049, 1055 (C.D. Cal.
1971) (“The business of professional basketball as conducted by NBA and the NBA teams
on a multi-state basis, coupled with the sale of rights to televise and broadcast the games for
interstate transmission, is trade or commerce among the several States within the meaning
of the Sherman Act.”), stay granted, 1971 WL3015 (9th Cir. Feb. 16, 1971), reinstated sub
nom. Haywood v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 401 U.S. 1204.
50. 613 F.2d 1379, 1383 (5th Cir. 1980) (explaining that once a player is hired by
a team, his working conditions are controlled not only by that team, but by the league as
well).
51. Cf. PAUL C. WEILER & GARY ROBERTS, SPORTS AND THE LAW 302–03 (3d ed.
2004) (explaining that multi-employer bargaining is now a common feature, because “[b]
oth employers and unions in these industries find they have a complimentary long-term
interest in putting their relationship on that broader footing”); WEISTART & LOWELL, supra
note 46, at 794 (“Multi-employer bargaining is presently used in professional sports . . .
.”); see also WONG, supra note 5, at 530 (describing that today “players associations have
become a powerful tool” in collective bargaining).
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multi-employer basis.52 In the sports industry, the inclusion of all teams within
a league, along with the league commissioner’s office, constitutes a multiemployer unit for collective bargaining.53
In the context of a multi–employer unit, challenges often arise over the
issues of individual bargaining and the union’s right to fair representation.54
Professional sports contracts have historically been made between a player and
a single team or organization. Meanwhile, the relevant collective bargaining
agreement does not set salaries for contracts, but rather contains constraints
concerning wages and conditions of employment within which players and
teams are free to negotiate.55 Each league sets forth in its CBA the limitations
or parameters in which a player and team can negotiate a salary, but no matter
the system, any employer that individually bargains with a player outside of
those parameters is committing an unfair labor practice.56
The Supreme Court’s standard for such action comes from J.I. Case Co.
v. NLRB,57 when the Court conceded that in some situations, allowing for
individual employees to bargain may be beneficial for the purpose of collective
bargaining.58 The Southern District of New York’s decision in Morio v. North
American Soccer League59 best illustrates the issue of individual bargaining
in sports.60 The Morio court granted a temporary injunction on all individual
contracts due to a violation of the employers’ duty to bargain exclusively with
the bargaining representatives of the players.61 Thus, in sports there is more
individual freedom of contract for employees under typical league collective
bargaining agreements, so long as the employees and the individual teams act
52. Id.
53. See, e.g., N. Am. Soccer League v. NLRB, 613 F.2d 1379, 1383 (5th Cir. 1980)
(explaining that there is a joint employer relationship between the North American Soccer
League and the various clubs that have a “proportionate role in League management”).
54. See generally NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local 499, 353 U.S. 87, 94–97 (1957)
(establishing the constitutionality of multi-employer bargaining).
55. See WONG, supra note 5 at 529–30 (explaining the difference between typical
sports contracts and those of other unions such as butchers, teachers, or grocery workers
who will negotiate specific salaries in collective bargaining).
56. Compare WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 51, at 305 (quoting Morio v. N. Am.
Soccer League, 501 F. Supp. 633, 638–39 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff’d, 632 F.2d 217 (2d Cir.
1980) (explaining that any individual bargaining outside of a CBA can be a violation under
the Act, because a union is entitled to conduct all bargaining with an employer), with
WEISTART & LOWELL, supra note 46, at 808 (describing how it has “been common for
collective bargaining agreements in professional sports to cover only the minimum terms .
. . and to specifically provide that individual athletes may negotiate individually for better
terms” (emphasis added)).
57. 321 U.S. 332 (1944).
58. See id. at 338 (noting that it may be wise for a CBA to set basic terms but to allow
further individualized bargaining, particularly when individual employees face different
work or personal circumstances).
59. 501 F. Supp. 633 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff’d, 632 F.2d 217 (2d Cir. 1980).
60. See id. at 635, 637 (finding that the soccer league’s clubs continued to negotiate
with individual players after the NLRB named the league as a multi-employer unit).
61. See id. at 638–39, 640 (“The duty to bargain carries with it the obligation on the
part of the employer not to undercut the Union by entering into individual contracts with
the employees.”).
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in good faith and within the parameters of the CBA.62
The duty to bargain in good faith is best seen through the behaviors and
actions of parties involved in collective bargaining.63 In sports, bad faith
bargaining accusations are usually the result of one party refusing to start or
continue negotiations with the other party.64 Both players associations and
leagues have been found guilty of unfair labor practices for a bad faith refusal
to negotiate over mandatory subjects of bargaining.65
While the Act vaguely mandates that all negotiations must be in good faith
“with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment,”66
several cases have explicitly held certain types of restraints and parameters
within collective bargaining to be mandatory subjects of bargaining in good
faith.67 Some of the most important bargaining issues are included in mandatory
subjects of collective bargaining, such as free agency,68

62. See WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 51, at 307 (discussing the free market
orientation of CBAs in sports and how such an orientation is different “than what one finds
in most unionized sectors.”).
63. See supra notes 17-37 and accompanying text.
64. See WEISTART & LOWELL, supra note 46, at 805 (explaining that bad faith has
een found when there was a refusal to negotiate or an attempt to bypass the other party with
a unilateral change in a mandatory subject matter of collective bargaining).
65. Compare Nat’l Football League Players Ass’n v. NLRB, 503 F.2d 12, 17 (8th
Cir. 1974) (“[B]y unilaterally promulgating and implementing a rule providing for an
automatic fine to be levied against any player who leaves the bench area while a fight or
an altercation is in progress on the football field, [employers] have engaged in unfair labor
practices.”), with WEISTART & LOWELL, supra note 46, at 805 & n.217.1 (explaining that
in 1976 the NBPA was found to have bargained in bad faith when it refused to bargain over
player restraint mechanisms that were mandatory subjects of bargaining, but which the
NBPA contended were violations of antitrust law).
66. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (2006).
67. Accord Mackey v. Nat’l Football League, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976); Powell
v. Nat’l Football League (“Powell II”), 930 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1989); Wood v. Nat’l
Basketball Ass’n, 809 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1987); Silverman v. Major League Baseball Player
Relations Comm., Inc. (“Silverman II”), 880 F. Supp. 246 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), aff’d, 67 F.3d
1054 (2d Cir. 1995).
68. See Mackey, 543 F.2d at 615 (holding that the “Rozelle Rule,” which provides
guidelines on free agency for NFL players, constitutes a mandatory subject of collective
bargaining).
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player mobility restraints69 (including compensation systems),70 salary caps,
player drafts,71 and salary arbitration.72
Challenges to mandatory subjects of bargaining in sports have often been
presented as antitrust claims under Sherman Act.73 These challenges are
typically defended by the non-statutory labor exemption that allows for a
league to engage in behavior that would otherwise be an antitrust violation,
so long as the action or restriction relates to mandatory subjects of collective
bargaining.74 Mackey v. National Football League provides the accepted
requirements with which a subject of collective bargaining in sports may be
exempt from trade restraints claims.75 The Eighth Circuit designated a threepart test to determine whether the restraint receives the labor exemption.76 For
the labor exemption to apply, (1) the restraint on trade must primarily affect
only the parties to the collective bargaining agreement; (2) the agreement must
concern a mandatory subject of collective bargaining; and (3) the agreement
must be the product of bona fide arm’s-length bargaining.77

69. See id. (noting that the Rozelle Rule “operates to restrict a player’s ability to
move from one team to another and depresses player salaries”).
70. See Powell II, 930 F.2d at 1303 (“The First Refusal/Compensation system, a
mandatory subject of collective bargaining, was twice set forth in collective bargaining
agreements negotiated in good faith . . . .”).
71. See, e.g., Wood, 809 F.2d at 961–62 (holding that the salary cap, entry draft,
minimum individual salaries, fringe benefits, minimum aggregate team salaries, guaranteed
revenue sharing, and first refusal provisions, “are mandatory subjects of bargaining . . .
[because] [e]ach of them clearly is intimately related to ‘wages, hours, and other terms and
conditions of employment’”).
72. See, e.g., Silverman v. Major League Baseball Player Relations Comm., Inc.,
880 F. Supp. 246, 257 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), aff’d, 67 F.3d 1054 (2d Cir. 1995) (finding that the
“salary arbitration for reserve players is also a mandatory part of the collective bargaining
process between the Players and the Owners.”).
73. See Mackey, 543 F.2d 606, 609, 610 (challenging an NFL rule that allowed the
league commissioner to force a club receiving a free agent to compensate the player’s former
club); Wood v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 809 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1987) (reciting contentions by
a national basketball player that “[a] ‘salary cap,’ college draft, and prohibition of player
corporations violated Sherman Act”).
74. See supra Part II.B; see also Local Union No. 189 v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters,
Butcher Workmen of N. Am. v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 689–90 (1965) (holding
that a marketing-hours restriction was related to wages and hours, and obtained through
collective bargaining, and thus fell within the “protection of the national labor policy and
[was] therefore exempt from the Sherman Act”).
75. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 614.
76. Id.
77. Id.
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III. HISTORY OF LABOR RELATIONS IN THE NFL AND THE NBA
Both the NBA and the NFL have exclusive bargaining agents that were first
recognized in the 1960’s—the NFLPA and the NBPA.78 During their tenure,
both labor organizations have negotiated numerous collective bargaining
agreements with their respective leagues, yet both the NFL and the NBA
have had their share of strikes, work stoppages and even cancelled seasons.79
Currently after a four-and-half month lockout, the 2011 NFL season is back
on track, after a new ten-year CBA was executed on July 21, 2011. 80 But, the
NBA’s 2011 season appears to be in jeopardy after the league and the NBPA’s
negotiations failed on July 1, 2011 the NBA filed an unfair labor practice
complaint with the NLRB and a suit against the NBPA in Federal District
Court of New York.81
A. Labor History of the National Football League
The NFLPA was formed in 1956 and became the exclusive bargaining unit
to NFL players in 1968.82 While there were small work stoppages in 1968,
1970, and 197483 the NFLPA encountered its first serious issue in the case of
Mackey v. National Football League.84
In Mackey, a group of present and former players sued the NFL, arguing that
the “Rozelle Rule,” was an unfair restraint on trade under the Sherman Act.85
This rule provided that, upon the expiration of a player’s original team contract,
if a player switched teams and the two teams could not reach a satisfactory
78. Compare About the NBPA, NAT’L BASKETBALL PLAYERS ASS’N, http://www.
nbpa.org/about-us (last visited Oct. 8, 2010) (explaining that the National Basketball
Players Association was founded in 1954), and WONG, supra note 5, at 531 (stating that
the National Football League Players Association was founded in 1956), with Mackey
v. Nat’l Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 610 (8th Cir. 1976) (pointing out that the NLRB
recognized the NFLPA in 1968 as the exclusive bargaining representative of all NFL
players), and Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Williams (“Williams II”), 45 F.3d 684, 686 (2d Cir.
1995) (referencing how the NBA and NBPA entered into their first collective bargaining
agreement in 1967).
79. See April Weiner, NFL and the CBA: Ranking the Worst Work Stoppages in
Pro Sports’ History, BLEACHER REPORT (March 10, 2011), http://bleacherreport.com/
articles/631338-nfl-and-the-cba-ranking-the-worst-work-stoppages-in-pro-sports-history
(noting that the NFL has had five work stoppages since its inception—four strikes and one
lockout—and the NBA has had three work stoppages, all of which were lockouts).
80. See DeMaurice Smith, Interview with Michel Martin host of NPR’s Tell Me
More (July 27, 2011) (transcript available at http://www.npr.org/2011/07/27/138738431/
nfls-longest-work-stoppage-ends).
81. See Nathan Koppel, NBA Takes Players Association to Court, WALL STREET
JOURNAL LAW BLOG (August 2, 2011, 12:35 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2011/08/02/
nba-takes-players-association-to-court/?mod=WSJBlog; Nat’l Basketball League, NBA
Files Unfair Labor Practice Charge, Lawsuit Against NBPA (August 2, 2011 10:38 AM),
http://www.nba.com/2011/news/08/02/nba-labor-lawsuit/.
82. Kapp v. Nat’l Football League, 390 F. Supp. 73, 83 (N.D. Cal. 1974), vacated in
part, No. 72-537, 1975 WL 959 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 11, 1975), aff’d, 586 F.2d 644 (9th Cir.
1978).
83. WONG, supra note 5, at 544 tbl.11.3.
84. 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976).
85. Id. at 609.
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arrangement on compensation, the league commissioner could transfer
substitute players from the player’s new team to the old team.86 League players
complained that the rule limited their free agency and argued that they could not
freely contract out their services.87 The NFL argued that it was shielded from
antitrust liability under the nonstatutory labor exemption within the Sherman
Act, due to its participation in a CBA.88 The District Court of Minnesota held
that “[the NFL’s] enforcement of the Rozelle Rule constituted a concerted
refusal to deal . . . and therefore was a per se violation of the Sherman Act.”89
The Eighth Circuit upheld the District Court’s ruling that because the Rozelle
Rule was not the product of “bona-fide arms length bargaining,” the labor
exemption did not apply and the Rozelle Rule was subject to antitrust scrutiny
under the Sherman Act.90 In a victory for the players, the court held that the
Rozelle Rule was a violation of antitrust law because it was an unreasonable
restraint on trade, but the court also encouraged the two sides to resolve the
issue of player mobility restraints through a collective bargaining agreement.91
The two sides came to an agreement in March of 1977 that contained league
concessions on “union security” and the league’s pension plans, in return for
new and different restrictions on free agency.92
Then, in 1982 following the expiration of the CBA, the NFL players went
on strike; this strike lasted fifty-seven days and ended with a new agreement.93
Later, in 1987, the NFL experienced its most significant labor dispute after
the expiration of the 1982 CBA when the NFL owners found replacements for
the striking players and the NBPA was forced to call off the strike after many
players were close to crossing the picket line to receive a paycheck.94 After
twenty–four days the strike ended, and the players returned to work under
similar pre-strike conditions.95
86. Id. at 610–11.
87. Id. at 609.
88. Id at 620–21.
89. Id. at 609 (citing Mackey v. Nat’l Football League, 407 F. Supp. 1000 (D. Minn.
.1975)).
90. See id. at 616 (observing that the clubs had unilaterally imposed the rule since
1963). See generally John Croke, An Examination of the Antitrust Issues Surrounding the
NBA Decertification Crisis, 5 SPORTS LAW. J. 163, 177-79 (1998) (discussing the “per se”
and “rule of reason” antitrust analyses in the decertification context).
91. See Mackey, 543 F.2d at 623 (“The parties are far better situated to agreeably
resolve what rules governing player transfers are best suited for their mutual interests than
are the courts.”).
92. See WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 51, at 231 (observing that the new rules
“proved even more restrictive than the old Rozelle Rule” and that only one player “actually
changed teams for compensation” from 1977 to 1987).
93. See WONG, supra note 5, at 531 (noting that the union conceded on the issue of
player mobility in return for better player salaries and benefits).
94. See generally Paul D. Staudohar, The Football Strike of 1987: The Question of
Free Agency, 111 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 26 (1988) (explaining the disputes over free agency
and player mobility in the 1987 strike). See id. at 29 (describing how two-thirds of the
league teams found replacement players, while the striking players, on the other hand, had
limited financial reserves and the union had no “strike fund” prepared).
95. See id. at 30 (stating that the strike ended October 15th).
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The fight was not over, and a group of players brought suit against the NFL
in the District Court of Minnesota for several restrictions contained in the
CBA and in the standard player contract—claiming that they were violations
of the Sherman Act.96 The court refused to order a preliminary injunction on
the issues and held that the labor exemption protected the NFL—as the parties
had not come yet to an impasse.97
The players appealed the district court’s decision that there was not yet
an impasse, but the Eighth Circuit reversed the District Court’s decision and
held that the labor exemption applies for “as long as there is a possibility that
proceedings may be commenced before the Board, or until final resolution of
Board proceedings and appeals.”98 Noting, in the decision, that antitrust claims
were not appropriate because labor policy favors “negotiated settlements
rather than intervention by courts.”99
Following this ruling, and having played two seasons without a CBA in
place, the NFLPA elected to decertify itself as the exclusive bargaining unit
through a league-wide player vote.100 Following decertification, another lawsuit
was filed against the NFL in Powell v. National Football League & McNeil
v. National Football League (Powell III).101 The District Court of Minnesota
held that because of the decertification of the NFLPA, the labor exemption no
longer protected the NFL and the player restraints challenged in the suit were

96. See Powell v. Nat’l Football League (“Powell I”), 678 F. Supp. 777, 778–79 (D.
Minn. 1988) (stating that plaintiffs “[sought] to enjoin defendants from implementing or
continuing a system of alleged player restraints [set up to restrict player mobility]”), rev’d,
930 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1989).
97. See id. at 788 (“[P]roper accommodation of labor and antitrust interests requires
that a labor exemption relating to a mandatory bargaining subject survive expiration
of the collective bargaining agreement until the parties reach impasse as to that issue;
thereafter, the term or condition is no longer immune from scrutiny . . . .”) The NLRB
has ruled an “impasse” to be a “matter of judgment” in which the Board considers:
[the] bargaining history, the good faith of the parties in negotiations, the length of the
negotiations, the importance of the issue or issues as to to [sic] which there is disagreement,
the contemporaneous understanding of the parties as to the state of negotiations . . . . See
Taft Broad. Co. & Am. Fed’n of Television & Radio Artists, 163 N.L.R.B. 475, 478 (1967);
see also Wong, supra note 5, at 544 (listing seven factors to consider).
98. See Powell v. Nat’l Football League (Powell II), 930 F.2d 1293, 1303–04 (8th Cir.
1989) (“[T]he nonstatutory labor exemption protects agreements conceived in an ongoing
collective bargaining relationship . . . beyond impasse. . . . ”)
99. Id. at 1303.
100. See WONG, supra note 6, at 531. Without a CBA, the league was able to institute
unilateral changes so long as the bargaining relationship existed, and these changes could
not be challenged as unfair labor practices through NLRB jurisdiction.
101. 764 F. Supp. 1351 (D. Minn. 1991).
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now vulnerable to antitrust violation claims.102 This time, a jury found that the
NFL’s compensation rule was a violation of the Sherman Act.103
Another suit was filed less than two weeks after Powell: White v. National
Football League.104 In White a group of players brought a class action suit
seeking total or modified free agency.105 White eventually settled out of court,
and the NFL paid $195 million to the class of players and granted greater free
agency to the NFL players.106 Not long after the Powell verdict, the players
once again elected the NFLPA as their exclusive bargaining representative and
the NFLPA successfully executed a new CBA in 1993.107
The most recent CBA, signed in 2006, included a provision allowing
owners to opt out of the agreement in March, 2011—instead of its expiration
in 2012.108 Months before the CBA actually expired, NFLPA executive director
DeMaurice Smith expressed concerns about the NFL making plans for a
lockout,109 and stated that every team had taken individual votes to determine
whether the NFLPA should once again decertify as the exclusive bargaining
unit.110
On March 11, 2011, the owners opted out of the agreement and the league
locked out its players.111 The same day, the NFLPA officially
decertified and a group of individual players filed a lawsuit in

102. See id. at 1358–59 (reasoning that, without a certified collective bargaining
representative, no further remedy or action before the Board remained, and thus there was
no longer the “ongoing collective bargaining relationship”).
103. See McDonough, supra note 6, at 840 (describing how the jury found that Plan
B had “a substantially harmful effect on competition” and caused economic injury to the
players (quoting Jackson v. Nat’l Football League, 802 F. Supp. 226, 229 n.2 (D. Minn.
1992))).
104. White v. Nat’l Football League, 822 F. Supp. 1389, 1394 (D. Minn. 1993), motion
for final approval of settlement granted, 836 F. Supp. 1458 (D. Minn. 1993), aff’d, 41 F.3d
402 (8th Cir. 1994).
105. Id. at 1394–95.
106. McDonough, supra note 6, at 842 (“But of greater importance is that the White
settlement, gained only after decertification of the players own union and subsequent court
victories, provided the most significant amount of free agency in the history of the NFL.”).
107. WONG, supra note 5, at 531.
108. See NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement 2006–2012 (Mar. 8, 2006) (unpublished
contract) (on file with author); see also WONG, supra note 5, at 546 (explaining that the “[o]
wners unanimously vote[d] to opt out of [the] collective bargaining agreement” on May
20, 2008, an act that resulted in the expiration date of the collective bargaining agreement
moving to May 1, 2011).
109. See Associated Press, Union Head Says Owners Set for Lockout, ESPN (Oct.
5, 2010), http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=5652700 (explaining that Smith has
pointed to the NFL’s recently asking banks to extend loan periods for league teams in the
event of a lockout).
110. See Doug Farrar, Players, NFL Dig In For Pending Labor Fight, YAHOO! SPORTS
(Nov. 18, 2010) http://sports.yahoo.com/nfl/news?slug=ys-nfllabor111810/ (describing the
actions of the league and the NFLPA in preparing for a possible lockout at the end of the
current season).
111. See Nate Davis, NFLPA Decertifies, Pursues Lockout Injunction Against NFL,
USA TODAY, http://content.usatoday.com/communities/thehuddle/post/2011/03/report-nflplayers-association-applies-for-decertification/1 (Mar. 12, 2011).
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U.S. District Court, alleging antitrust violations and seeking an
injunction regarding the lockout.112 In the months since then, the
NFLPA has engaged in a series of court hearings, court-mandated mediation and
numerous negotiation meetings.113 Then, on July 25, 2011 NFL Commissioners
Roger Goodell and DeMaurice Smith announced that the league and the
NFLPA had reached a new ten-year CBA which would end the lockout and
that “[f]ootball [was] back.”114
B. Labor History of the National Basketball Association
The exclusive bargaining unit of the NBA is the NBPA, which was founded
in 1954.115 The NBA entered into its first CBA in 1967.116 Following the 1971
decision in Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management, Inc.,117 which provided
that the NBA participated in interstate commerce,118 and thus, by extension,
would fall within the jurisdiction of the NLRB.119
Wood v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n120 provided a major victory for the league in
the labor relationship. Leon Wood, a college basketball player drafted in the
first round of the NBA draft, brought suit against the league and argued that
the draft and salary cap were illegal restraints of trade.121 Despite finding that
the draft and salary cap actually injured Wood and others in the position of
drafted players, the Wood court held that all trade restraints were the product of
collective bargaining and thus could not be challenged on antitrust grounds.122

112. See id.
113. See generally Sal Paolantonio, Players, Owners Facing Tight Squeeze, ESPN.
COM (July 11, 2011), http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/columns/story?columnist=paolantonio_
sal&id=6756795 (describing the federal judge-mandated negotiations between the league
and NFL player representatives).
114. See Players Vote to Approve New Labor Deal, Put End to Extended Lockout,
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (July 25, 2011 9:40 PM), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2011/
football/nfl/07/25/nfl-labor-deal.ap/index.html.
115. See About the NBPA, supra note 78 (discussing how the NBA recognized the
NBPA as the exclusive union representative of all NBA players when the players threatened
not to play in the first televised All-Stars game).
116. Id.
117. 325 F. Supp. 1049 (C.D. Cal. 1971), stay granted, 1971 WL 3015 (9th Cir. Feb.
16, 1971), reinstated sub nom. Haywood v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 401 U.S. 1204 (1971).
118. See id. at 1062 (noting that the NBA operates in seventeen metropolitan areas,
schedules games in numerous states, and receives revenue from nationwide broadcasts).
119. See supra notes 47–49 and accompanying text.
120. 809 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1987).
121. Id. at 956–57.
122. Id. at 959, 960 (rebuffing a basketball player’s argument that his superior skills
vis-à-vis other players should permit him to insist on individual bargaining, because
“collective agreements routinely set standard wages for employees with differing
responsibilities, skills, and levels of efficiency”); see McDonough supra note 6, at 833–34
(highlighting the fact that Wood still lost the suit even though at the time he was not yet a
part of the bargaining unit but an in-coming college athlete, and explaining that the court
relied on the definition of “employee” in the NLRA in holding against Wood).
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Besides the Wood decision, the first major labor issue in the NBA arose
in 1995.123 Facing the imminent expiration of the CBA in 1994, the league
and players managed to reach a no-strike, no-lockout agreement to protect
the 1994–95 season; the players played under the regulations of the previous
agreement in hopes of striking a new deal during the season.124 However,
following the expiration of the CBA on June 23, 1994 the NBA and its teams
brought suit against the class of present and future NBA players seeking a
judgment stipulating:
(i) that the continued imposition of the disputed provisions of the CBA
[the college draft, the salary cap, and the right of first refusal for free
agents] would not violate the antitrust laws because that imposition is
“governed solely by the labor laws and is exempt from antitrust liability
under the nonstatutory exemption to the antitrust laws”; and (ii) that
the disputed provisions are lawful even if the antitrust laws apply.125
The Second Circuit ruled for the league and cited the labor exemption as
providing the league with immunity from possible antitrust challenges so long
as there was a collective bargaining relationship between the parties.126
After the 1995 season, the loss in Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Williams
(“Williams I”), and the failure to negotiate a new CBA, a group of NBA
players who were unhappy with the current league provisions signed a petition
to decertify the players association as their exclusive bargaining agent.127 The
association’s biggest stars, led by Michael Jordan and Patrick Ewing, also
brought an antitrust suit in District Court.128 Eventually, the NLRB conducted

123. See WONG, supra note 5, at 549 tbl.11.3 (noting that in 1995, the NBPA threatened
to decertify during an owners’ lockout).
124. Robert Bradley, Labor Pains Nothing New to NBA, ASS’N FOR PROF’L
BASKETBALL RES., http://www.apbr.org/labor.html (last visited May 30, 2010).
125. See Williams II, 45 F.3d 684, 686 (2d Cir. 1995) (finding that the players had
refused to negotiate with the NBA until the 1988 CBA had expired); see also McDonough,
supra note 6, at 835 (indicating that the same restrictions had been challenged eight years
prior in Wood).
126. See 45 F.3d at 691, 693 (holding that even after the expiration of a collective
bargaining agreement, where there is a collective bargaining relationship employers can
still bargain with a union, implement joint proposals, and use economic pressure to secure
agreement on proposals).
127. See 1 AARON N. WISE & BRUCE S. MEYER, INTERNATIONAL SPORTS LAW AND
BUSINESS 95 (1997) (describing the 1995 negotiations and the resulting attempt to get rid
of the union leadership).
128. See id. (stating that the lawsuit alleged that any joint action by the NBA owners,
whether a lockout, the return of the old salary cap system, or a new system, “would violate
the antitrust laws in the absence of a union”).
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an election that would determine whether the players association would
be decertified.129 By a vote of 226–134 the union remained the exclusive
bargaining agent.130 Still without a CBA, the NBPA and the league continued to
negotiate and eventually created a new agreement in July 1996, all without any
significant work stoppages—either by a player strike or an owner lockout.131
The new six–year CBA, however, contained a provision allowing owners to
re–open negotiations after three years if player salaries rose too high relative
to league income, and in 1998, the NBA faced a work stoppage.132 During the
season, on March 23, 1998, the owners voted to reopen negotiations, and, after
nine negotiation sessions that produced little progress, the league announced
a lockout beginning July 1, 1998.133 The lockout lasted six months, and right
before the 1998–1999 season was set to be cancelled, the sides settled on a
new CBA and agreed to play a shortened season beginning in February.134 Both
sides made concessions in the settlement, with the players suffering a new cap
on individual salaries, while the owners lost in their efforts to institute a hard
team salary cap.135
The most recent CBA came into existence on July 1, 2005 and expired on
June 30, 2011.136 The owners made the decision to refuse an option to continue
the CBA until 2012, and the struggles in negotiation over the past six months
have resulted in both sides questioning whether there will be an NBA season
in 2011.137 Prior to the expiration of the CBA, the NBPA filed an unfair labor
charge against the league with the Board for unfair bargaining practices,

129. Id.; see Murray Chass, N.B.A. Taking a Timeout for Decertification Results, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 12, 1995, at B12 (“If the union wins, the players will continue to have a labor
relationship with the N.B.A., short-circuiting an antitrust suit . . . [if] the NLRB certifies
the results, Judge David Doty of United States District Court in Minneapolis will consider
the players’ request to issue a preliminary injunction ending the league’s lockout of the
players.”).
130. David Steele, NBA Players Vote for Union Decertification Fails; Lockout Could
End Friday, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., Sept. 13, 1995, at B1.
131. See WISE & MEYER, supra note 127, at 95–96 (describing the tumultuous
relationship between the owners and union following the decertification election).
132. Paul D. Staudohar, Labor Relations in Basketball: The Lockout of 1998-99, 122
MONTHLY LAB. REV. 3, 4-5 (1999) [hereinafter, Staudohar, Labor Relations in Basketball].
133. Id. at 4–5 (explaining that the league claimed nearly half of its 29 teams were
losing money, and that players were receiving 57 percent of total revenue in salaries, a
number much greater than the threshold 51.8% that allowed owners to reopen negotiations).
134. Id. at 8.
135. Id.
136. 2005 [NBA] Collective Bargaining Agreement art. XXXIX (unpublished
contract) (on file with author), available at http://www.nbpa.org/cba/2005.
137. See Coon, supra note 3 (“If the league and players’ union don’t come to terms
on a new agreement by then, the league will impose a lockout, a work stoppage that will
disrupt business and could possibly lead to the cancellation of the entire 2011-12 season.”);
see also Chris Mannix, As Two Sides Stand Firm, Lockout Seems Inevitable For NBA,
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (July 12, 2010), http:// sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2010/writers/chris_
mannix/07/12/stern.las.vegas/ (noting that the league’s current proposal and the players’
current proposal are “miles apart”).
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complaining the NBA’s goal was to avoid meaningful negotiation until a
lockout was in place.138 Following the expiration of the CBA, the owners
initiated a lockout,139 and the biggest issue the two sides are in disagreement
about is revenue sharing between owners and players.140 NBA commissioner
David Stern and NBPA executive director Billy Hunter have met for several
negotiations, but since expiration, progress has stalled and both sides appear
unafraid to discuss the possibility of a lengthy work stoppage.141
IV. ANALYSIS OF NLRB DECERTIFICATION AND ITS NEGATIVE EFFECTS
While the NFL players have decertified their union once before, both the
NFLPA and NBPA considered the option of Board–regulated decertification in
light of the threat of a lockout in 2011.142 However, decertification of a union
provides instability and it is unlikely to result in any large benefits—in contrast
to the advantages of continued negotiation through an exclusive bargaining
agent certified by the Board.
A. Legal Options of a Decertified Players’ Association to
Challenge Trade Restraints
The Eighth Circuit established that any trade restraint is a mandatory
subject of collective bargaining. Yet, today almost all salary caps, free agency
restrictions, and rookie drafts fall under the labor exemption—so long as a
collective bargaining relationship exists.143 Thus, a players’ association who
desires to pursue an antitrust claim against a league is presented with a many
number of options under the Sherman Act.
In Powell II, the court lists several choices for labor organizations faced
with possible restraints on trade, including exerting economic pressure and
presenting claims to the Board.144 Additionally, in Williams I, Judge Duffy
opined that the players union could decertify under Board regulations and
subsequently bring antitrust claims against the NBA, but did not advise the
players to pursue this course of action.145 As the Eighth Circuit explained:
138. See ESPN.COM, supra note 4.
139. See id.
140. See Coon, supra note 3 (“The players are guaranteed fifty-seven percent of the
league’s revenues . . . before expenses come out.”).
141. See Adrian Wojnarowski, NBA Lockout Threatens Entire Season, YAHOO SPORTS,
http://sports.yahoo.com/nba/news?slug=aw-wojnarowski_nba_lockout_players_063011
(June 30, 2011) (“[T]here’s a real chance the NBA is gone for a full year now. This has the
makings of the NHL’s labor war of 2004-05, where the cost of instituting a hard salary cap
cost the sport a complete season.”).
142. See generally Coon, supra note 3 (noting that “fewer than ten percent of the
players who experienced the lockout in 1998-99 are still in the league”).
143. See Powell II, 930 F.2d 1293, 1303 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding that the labor exemption
protects “agreements conceived in an ongoing collective bargaining relationship . . .” from
antitrust liability). See also supra notes 135–39 and accompanying text (discussing the
“impasse” and “bargaining relationship” tests).
144. See id.
145. See Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Williams (Williams I), 857 F. Supp. 1069, 1078
(S.D.N.Y. 1994) (aff’d, 45 F.3d 684 (2d Cir. 1995).

366

THE LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW FORUM

[Vol. 1:3

[W]e are not compelled to look into the future and pick a
termination point for the labor exemption. The parties are now faced
with several choices. They may bargain further . . . [t]hey may resort
to economic force. And finally, if appropriate issues arise, they may
present claims to the [Board]. We are satisfied that as long as there is
a possibility that proceedings may be commenced before the Board,
or until final resolution of Board proceedings and appeals therefrom,
the labor relationship continues and the labor exemption applies.146
A decertified labor organization holds almost no actual power; instead, the
power to bring legal action lies in the hands of individual employees.147 Not
only will the players have to provide their own legal representation— instead of
relying on the union to bring suit or an unfair labor practices complaint against
the league—but the chances of winning such lawsuits are not a certainty for
the players.148
This theory is exemplified by Caldwell—where a player in the American
Basketball Association brought suit against the league and his team for a
suspension.149 The court ruled, however, that because the American Basketball
Association Players Association had received Board certification as the
exclusive bargaining unit, Caldwell’s proper pursuit of a claim was through
the NLRB by alleging unfair labor practices, rather than an antitrust suit.150
More recently a group of NBA players lost their antitrust counterclaims in
Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Williams.151 In dicta, the court reasoned that there was
no per se violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act, and therefore considered
the reasonableness of the challenged restraints.152 Applying a “rule of reason”
analysis, the Williams court reasoned that the salary cap, the restrictions on
free agency, and the college draft were not anti–competitive.153

146. Powell II, 930 F.2d at 1303.
147. See Croke, supra note 90 at 177 (warning that decertification would leave the
individual players to “fend for themselves”).
148. Compare Mackey v. Nat’l Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 622 (8th Cir. 1976)
(holding that the Rozelle Rule was a violation of antitrust law), with Williams I, 857 F.
Supp. 1069, 1078–79 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (deciding on exemption grounds but positing in
dicta that the challenged trade restraints were not violations of antitrust law), aff’d, 45 F.3d
684 (2d Cir. 1995).
149. See id. at 526 (explaining that Caldwell alleged that the team and league conspired
to “blacklist” him to ensure that he could never play in the league again).
150. See id. at 530 (“[I]f Caldwell is allowed to proceed with the present action,
employees in similar circumstances will either never resort to the NLRB or will
institute parallel administrative and antitrust proceedings with the risk of inconsistent
adjudications.”).
151. See Williams I, 857 F. Supp. at 1071, 1078, 1079 (characterizing professional
athletic associations as joint ventures, not as “competitors in any economic sense”
(quoting Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1178–79 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (emphasis in
original))).
152. Id. at 1078–79.
153. See id. at 1079 (“The pro-competitive effects of these practices, in particular the
maintenance of competitive balance, may outweigh their restrictive consequences.”).
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Most recently, the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Brady v. NFL154 may be
interpreted by other circuits as holding that lockouts are legal, even in the
face of decertified unions.155 This decision could greatly impact the strongest
weapon of decertified unions, the assurance that decertified unions can bring
antitrust claims against a league instituting a lockout. Even if such reading of
the June 8, 2011 decision is a stretch of the imagination, the Eighth Circuit’s
opinion solidifies the notion that lockouts cannot be enjoined, and as such,
any lockout would remain in place until the merits of the case are heard.156 For
example, the Brady case would not have been heard by a U.S. District Court
until 2012, thus ensuring that without a negotiated deal, the NFL could have
cancelled the upcoming season, despite whether or not the NFLPA elected to
decertify.
Thus, continuing the union as the certified exclusive bargaining unit under the
oversight of the NLRB is a more stable option in furthering the players’ efforts
to affect change in league provisions, as union lawsuits and unfair labor practice
claims are less expensive and will be possibly more successful than individual
antitrust lawsuits brought by players outside of the union.
Finally, there exists the possibility of NBA or NFL owners bringing a bad
faith bargaining charge against their respective players’ association concerning
the decision to decertify.157 Looking at the current status of the NFL, with every
team voting—most unanimously—for decertification more than four months
before the current CBA expires,158 the league could argue that the players had
no desire to reach an agreement.159 By decertifying immediately following the
CBA expiration, the NFL and the NBA players would be placing themselves in
a different situation from the 1989 NFLPA, which only decertified following a
failed court challenge and two seasons of play without an agreement in place.160

154. Brady v. Nat’l Football League, Docket No. 11-1898 (8th Cir. 2011).
155 See Michael McCann, Burning Questions From Eighth Circuit Ruling To Extend
NFL Lockout, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (May 16, 2011) http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2011/
writers/michael_mccann/05/16/nfl.lockout/index.html.
156 See Brady (“[W]e conclude that § 4(a) of the Norris-LaGuardia Act deprives a
federal court of power to issue an injunction prohibiting a party to a labor dispute from
implementing a lockout of its employees.”).
157. Cf. HARDIN ET AL., supra note 14, at 803 (explaining that the Board can find bad
faith even if a party is willing to meet, so long as the Bard finds that the party “is merely
going through the motions of bargaining”).
158. See supra note 110.
159. See NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 133 F.2d 676, 686 (9th Cir. 1943)
(holding that the duty of good faith is an obligation “to participate actively . . . as to indicate
a present intention to find a basis for agreement . . . ‘[with] an open mind and sincere desire
to reach an agreement’” (quoting NLRB v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 118 F.2d 874, 885 (1st
Cir. 1941)).
160. See generally WONG, supra note 5 at 544–45 & tbl.11.3 (describing the history of
the 1989 NFLPA decertification struggle).
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B. NLRB-Provided Oversight for Players Associations as Certified Exclusive
Bargaining Agents
Unlike the uncertainty of antitrust lawsuits, any certified bargaining
agent has the ability to use NLRB regulations to challenge their employer.161
Congress adopted the NLRA and its amendments in order to provide “a[n]
array of rules and remedies” for employee unions to challenge their employers
outside the scope of antitrust law.162 The original Wagner Act, passed in 1935,
sought to significantly change labor law through providing additional rights
to employees and additional outlets for employee-management disputes.163
Congress recognized that the only way to successfully implement the new labor
rights was to establish “the type of administrative agency that had become a
hallmark for much of the New Deal legislation.”164 With strict procedures and
clear jurisdiction, the NLRB-regulated claims of unfair labor practices and bad
faith negotiations provide labor unions with the stability necessary to challenge
groups as powerful as sports leagues and team owners.165 Finally, the presence
of a collective bargaining unit and subsequent bargaining relationship do not
exclude a union from bringing a successful antitrust suit against its employer,
while the decertification of such union does preclude any unfair labor practice
challenge under the Act.166
The presence of an exclusive bargaining agent and a collective bargaining
relationship allow for parties to use economic sanctions. The players have the
ability to strike, as set forth in the Act.167 However, even during a strike, a union
161. See HARDIN ET AL., supra note 14, at 27 (observing that the NLRA Act conferred
a triad of essential rights: “(1) the right to organize; (2) the right to bargain collectively; and
(3) the right to engage in strikes [and other concerted activities]”).
162. Caldwell v. Am. Basketball Ass’n, 66 F.3d 523, 530 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting
Williams II, 45 F.3d 684, 693 (2d Cir. 1995)) (“Every employee who is locked out by
a multiemployer group, every striker who is not reinstated, and every employee who is
discharged could bring an antitrust action . . . Clearly, Congress had no such intention. As
noted, the NLRA offers ‘a[n] array of rules and remedies . . . and . . . application of antitrust
principles to a collective bargaining relationship would disrupt collective bargaining as we
know it.’”).
163. See HARDIN ET AL., supra note 14, at 26-27 (“Caught in the labyrinth of modern
industrialism . . . the employee can attain freedom and dignity only by cooperation
with other employees.” (quoting 79 CONG. REC. 7565 (1935) (statement of Sen. Robert
Wagner)).
164. See id. at 28 (creating the Board).
165. See generally WONG, supra note 5, at 520 (outlining the procedural process of
filing an unfair labor charge with the Board).
166. See Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 250 (1996) (“[A]n agreement among
employers could be sufficiently distant in time and in circumstances from the collectivebargaining process that a rule permitting antitrust intervention would not significantly
interfere with that process.”). The Brown decision also noted that investigation into the
requirements of insulation from antitrust law should come from the Board “to whose
‘specialized judgment’ Congress ‘intended to leave’ many of the ‘inevitable questions
concerning multiemployer bargaining bound to arise in the future’.” See id. (quoting
NLRB v. Truck Divers Local 499, 353 U.S. 87, 96 (1957)).
167. See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006) (“Employees shall have the right . . . to engage in
other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection . . . .”).
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is still bound to bargain in good faith.168 Employers, on the other hand, have
the ability to “lockout” their employees as a negotiation tactic in collective
bargaining.169 A likely provision in any CBA is a “no strike, no lockout” clause
during the term of the CBA, which ensures that these economic sanctions will
only be used if the agreement expires before a new one is signed.170 If there
is no exclusive bargaining unit, and thus no bargaining relationship, players
would not have the statutory authority to strike,171 yet it remains unclear
whether owners could lock out their employees.172
From 1987–1989, the NFL played for two seasons without a collective
bargaining agreement, with only a minor three-week strike in 1987.173 However,
when the NFLPA decertified in 1989, the owners lost their ability to lock out
the players, but the players were also unable to bargain for any sort of benefits
and were forced to play under the league’s unilateral provisions concerning
free agency and salary caps.174 Thus, while a Board decertification may ensure
that the NBA will play the 2011 season, if the season occurs, the league and
owners could attempt to unilaterally decide upon the provisions surrounding
every season played where the players do not have an exclusive bargaining
unit.175

168. See § 158(b)(3) (“It shall be an unfair labor practice . . . to refuse to bargain
collectively with an employer, provided it is the representative of his employees subject to
the provisions of section 159(a) . . . .”).
169. See Am. Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB 380 U.S. 300, 318 (1965) (holding “an employer
violates neither § 8(a) (1) nor § 8(a)(3) [of the Act] when, after a bargaining impasse
has been reached, he temporarily shuts down his plant and lays off his employees for the
sole purpose of bringing economic pressure to bear in support of his legitimate bargaining
position.”).
170. See generally WEISTART & LOWELL, supra note 46, at 823–29 (discussing the
economic uses of strikes and lockouts by bargaining parties).
171. See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006) (granting employees the right to engage in concerted
activities “for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection”).
172. Compare WISE & MEYER, supra note 127, at 95 (“[M]ultiple employers cannot
conduct a lockout if there is no union”), with WEISTART & LOWELL, supra note 46, at 827
(stating that economic sanctions can only be used “so long as bargaining is pursued in good
faith and the lockout is utilized only after the bargaining process has reached stalemate or
impasse.”).
173. See id. at 545–46 (charting the NFL collective bargaining history from 1968 to
2008, and including the 1987 player strike and the 1993 CBA signing).
174. See generally Thomas George, N.F.L.’s 7-Year Plan Was Really 5 Years of
Cheating History, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 1993, at B15 (arguing that, prior to the 1993 NFL
CBA, the league had instituted “a heavy-handed, one-sided free agency system” that
produced only two free agent moves over five years).
175. See Coon, supra note 3 (noting that players not represented by a collective
bargaining unit lose key protections and benefits).

370

THE LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW FORUM

[Vol. 1:3

Collective bargaining relationships in sports often produce benefits to the
players in return for sacrificing much of their “free market” abilities through
restraints like the draft or salary cap.176 Both the NFL and NBA’s current
agreements contain explicit sections concerning health care, as well as
retirement and pension plans, which are all benefits the union has accrued
in negotiations with their respective leagues.177 There will be little, if any
incentive for the NBA to continue providing these benefits to the players in the
event of union decertification.178 As professional basketball can lead to long–
sustaining and career–ending injuries, the presence of a retirement and pension
plan is something of great value to all current, past, and future players in either
league. Without a CBA—indeed—without a bargaining agent in general, it is
unclear whether a pension plan would be as strong as the current plans are or
if they the plans would exist at all.
Concerning player retirement, the short nature of professional athletic
careers plays a role in pursuing actions against a league, as well as negotiations
with leagues and owners. Between the lack of job security and the short length
of a players’ career (as well as his earnings peak), the possibility of playing
under unilateral salary restraints for any amount of time can jeopardize the
earning capacity of NBA athletes.179 While the NFL players were ultimately
successful in their lawsuits against the league in Powell–McNeil and White,
the process from the 1987 strike to the 1993 court decisions lasted longer than
an average NFL player’s career.180 Clearly, the success of these lawsuits comes
at a price, while the ability to consistently play under mutually agreed-upon
CBAs provides a more stable economic scheme for professional athletes.
Therefore, the abilities of a decertified union and its members to exact any
change or to succeed in obtaining any beneficial economic provisions pales
in comparison to both the powers of a certified union, as well as the limited
capabilities of leagues who are obligated to negotiate with such unions under
the NLRA.

176. See Croke, supra note 90, at 176 (noting that collective bargaining negotiations
produce benefits such as minimum team salaries, which would most likely be eliminated
if a union decertified); Union: NFL Will Cut Off Health Benefits in Event of a Lockout,
SPORTS BUS. DAILY (Oct. 20, 2010), http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/article/142994
(explaining that the NFL league office stated that if the two sides do not agree on a new
CBA, the NFL would stop providing health care to NFL players and their families).
177. See, e.g., NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement 2006-2012, supra note 178, at
arts. XLVI, XLVII (explaining the responsibilities of the team owners to provide health
coverage and retirement benefits); 2005 Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 108,
at arts. III, IV (same).
178. See, e.g., Union: NFL Will Cut Off Health Benefits in Event of a Lockout, supra
note 192 (illustrating that without a CBA, leagues will cut the costs of providing benefits
for their players).
179. See Lock, supra note 23, at 385 (arguing that because of a lack of job scurity and
a short average career length, NFL players are unlikely to reach their earning potential if
they strike or play without a CBA).
180. See generally How Long is the Average NFL Career?, LIVESTRONG, http://www.
livestrong.com/article/15527-long-average-career-nfl-player/ (last visited Mar. 27, 2011)
(explaining that an average career in the NFL is 3.3 years).

2011]

STRENGTH IN NUMBERS

371

C. Economic Realities of Salary Negotiations and the Failure of the Free
Market Argument in Today’s Economy
One of the statutorily imposed mandatory subjects of collective bargaining
is wages,181 and the collective bargaining unit makes a significant difference
in players’ wages today. In professional sports, there is a large disparity in the
salaries of top players and the players who receive the minimum contract.182
While it is possible to argue that the decertification of a union and removal of
a collective bargaining relationship would allow all players to receive their
“free market worth,”183 this thought process is severely shortsighted.184 When
the NBA attempted to decertify in 1995, it was led by superstars Michael
Jordan and Patrick Ewing, who fought hard against the institution of a hard
salary cap and received record-breaking salaries.185 Thus, the benefit felt from
the presence of a free market, or even the ability to circumvent certain salary
restrictions, rises to the top.
This, in contrast to the anticompetitive nature of unions under the Board,
seeks uniformity within the ranks of the union.186 While the superstars of the
NBA would probably see their contracts rise in a free market, there would be
little, if any beneficial effect for the majority of the league.187 Additionally, while
players like Michael Jordan argued that there is a competitive disadvantage
for “highly skilled” employees, much of the trade provisions in sports extend
beyond specific salaries.188 While opponents of certification may argue that
the players associations would be committing unfair employee representation
practices, such a claim is short sighted in light of Steele v. Louisville &
181. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (2006) (specifying that collective bargaining units are the
exclusive employee representatives allowed to collectively bargain for employees’ wages).
182. See Staudohar, Labor Relations in Basketball, supra note 132, at 6 (explaining
that, while the mean salary is $2.6 million, half of players make less than $1.4 million).
183. See McDonough supra note 6, at 859 (noting that the “non-statutory” labor
exemption protects salary caps from antitrust claims).
184. But cf. WEISTART & LOWELL, supra note 46, at 813 (conceding how difficult it
would be for “star” players to complain of a CBA that would benefit the majority of players
to the star players’ detriment).
185. See Staudohar, Labor Relations in Basketball, supra note 132, at 4, 5, 6
(explaining that when the 1996 CBA retained the salary cap, it also had a “Larry Bird”
exception, under which Jordan was able to sign a one-year, $30 million contract). In Major
League Baseball, when there was no salary cap, but only a “luxury tax,” the top salary was
over $20 million more than the league minimum. See WEILER & ROBERTS , supra note 51,
at 307 (explaining that in 2003, Alex Rodriguez of the New York Yankees received $22
million salary in comparison to the league minimum of $300,00).
186. See Robert A. McCormick, Interference on Both Sides: The Case Against the
NFL-NFLPA Contract, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 397, 406-07 (1996) (explaining that the
union’s goal of reducing competition among employees regarding wages and conditions is
accomplished when employers agree to establish uniform terms of employment).
187. See generally Staudohar, Labor Relations in Basketball, supra note 132, at 6–7
(discussing how, even with salary caps, bottom players tend to have little in the way of
payouts compared to stars).
188. See, e.g., NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement 2006-2012, supra note 108,
at arts. VII, X, XXVIII (regulating issues such discrimination, personal appearance, and
injury grievances); 2005 [NBA] Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 136, at arts.
VI, XXVIII (incorporating attendance rules and telecom rights).
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Nashville Railroad, which allows a union to make provisions for differing
treatment among its members based on “competence and skill.”189
Uncertainty of decertification extends additionally to the protections that a
collective bargaining relationship provides to the union group as a whole in
terms of wages, and that protection is vital in the economic realities of 2011.190
The NBA’s current salary situation illustrates the problematic possibilities of
employees working without the protections of Board-regulated negotiations.191
With teams acting more conservative economically, either the disparity in
salary will skyrocket between the best players and the rest of the league, or the
lack of salary cap could result in a decrease in salaries in general.192
Finally, the players may have a viable claim of bad faith bargaining against
the owners due to the owners’ refusal to turn over financial documents.193 The
NBPA has questioned the league’s claims that teams are losing money in recent
years, and the leagues and teams in general have not sufficiently opened their

189. 323 U.S. 192, 203 (1944); see, e.g., NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement 20062012, supra note 108, at art. XXIV, § 1(c) (listing several instances in which compensation
can differ amongst players with different competency levels); 2005 [NBA] Collective
Bargaining Agreement, supra note 136, at art. VII, § 4 (same).
190. But see Liz Mullen, Hunter: Talk of $400M NBA Loss ‘Baloney’, SPORTS BUS.
J. (May 31, 2010), http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Journal/Issues/2010/05/20100531/
This-Weeks-News/Hunter-Talk-Of-$400M-NBA-Loss-Baloney.aspx (expressing the view
that while NBPA Executive Director Billy Hunter does not believe that the NBA is losing
$400 million, the NBA has already provided the union with boxes of financial records in
support of that claim).
191. Compare 2010 NBA Free Agents and Signings, BACKSEAT FAN, http://
backseatfan.com/2010/07/2010-nba-free-agents-and-signings/ (last visited Mar. 27, 2011)
(charting how, in the summer of 2010, 9 NBA players signed a maximum or near-maximum
allowable contract despite owners’ claims of financial hardship), with WONG, supra note
5, at 532 (noting that the removal of the salary floor would result in “tremendous cost
savings at the players’ expense”). See generally Michael J. Redding, Third and Long:
The Issues Facing the NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement Negotiations and the Effect
of an Uncapped Year, 20 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 95, 102 (2009) (“Operating without a
minimum salary requirement would allow the owners to set the market for free agents and
rookies without any artificial salary floors.”).
192. See Redding, supra note 109, at 102 (noting how the NFL owners believe that
“the current financial model is harming them by providing the players with too large of a
revenue share”).
193. Compare NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 755–56 (1956) (“Good faith
bargaining necessarily requires that claims made by either bargainer should be honest
claims . . . [if] . . . an argument is important enough to present in the give and take of
bargaining, it is important enough to require some sort of proof of its accuracy.”), with
WEISTART & LOWELL, supra note 46, at 805 (stating that furnishing information to a union
has been found to be an element of the employer’s duty to bargain in good faith, but that
first a union must make a “good faith request for the information to be furnished” and that
such information has to be relevant).
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books to the players’ association.194 While the law only requires an employer
to disclose financial documents when there is a stated “inability to pay,” the
economic claims of the league may warrant an order to disclose financial
information.195 Even if a bad faith bargaining claim would be unsuccessful,
forcing the NBA to claim that it could pay wages, but simply desires to lower
them, would be a valuable bargaining chip in collective bargaining negotiations.
The NBPA should remain certified as the exclusive bargaining agent under
the Board. Based on the stable options available to Board–certified unions in
collective bargaining and the benefits of administrative oversight, as well as
the recent legal challenges in the NFL labor dispute, decertifying either union
and attempting to individually bargain for contracts without a CBA in place
will ultimately hurt the players as a group.

194. See Union Head Smith: NFL Owners Gearing Up for Lockout in 2011, NAT’L
FOOTBALL LEAGUE, http://www.nfl.com/news/story/09000d5d81b1858f/article/unionhead-smith-nfl-owners-gearing-up-for-lockout-in-2011 (last visited Oct. 5, 2010)
(describing the union representative’s complaints about the league’s willingness to turn
over financial documents). Billy Hunter has repeatedly questioned David Stern’s claims
of financial loss and has requested additional documents. See Mullen, supra note 190
(explaining that Hunter has requested “the sales prospectuses NBA teams have shown
to buyers and would-be buyers of franchises in the last few years” to illustrate that teams
are advertising themselves as profitable to potential buyers, while claiming losses to the
union).
195. See Nielsen Lithographing Co. & Graphic Comms. Int’l Union, 305 N.L.R.B.
697, 701 (1991) (holding that an employer also need not disclose its “projection of its future
ability to compete” but that such estimation of its ability to compete is not “equate[d]” with
its ability to pay).

